Just want to give the heads up on some research i had to do due to confusion with the new releases that showed up for Proxima & Obsession from mocha.

issues with trying to install them, both come with their own Synapse Audio Keygens Versions 1.0.2 & 1.0.3. For me they both didn't work giving me an error 0000x5.

The instructions say to run as admin but for me specifically both versions had no joy at all despite messing around for an hour installing windows 11 dependencies to rule them out.

I sandboxed both files in virus total and another which both reported the keygen works and show 1 trojan from several providers which looks good in theory with the report that came with them both do not show any suspect behavior really.

I thought it very strange that both versions do not work on my x64 windows 11 at all both with the 00000x5 error, just so you know ill admit this might be a false alarm just as the comments on audioz & other sites do specifically mention that the keygens work for other people and if this is the case then perfect although if this isn't the case at all then users may think about doing what i did and going backwards in Mocha releases until a working keygen is found. Well this is what i did and the only working mocha keygen i can find which works on my pc is "MOCHA_Synapse_Audio_Keygen.exe" and this is where the problem is.

This MOCHA_Synapse_Audio.exe appears to be a sophisticated dropper/C2 agent, not a software keygen. The behavioral analysis shows unambiguous malware indicators:

1. Actively detects when running in a sandbox/VM and changes behavior.

2. Process Injection into Google Updater
It drops fake Google Updater processes (updater.exe) into C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\GoogleUpdater/, injects code into them, then terminates them. Persistence + privilege escalation pattern. The cleanup of injected processes indicates sophisticated malware that knows what it's doing.

3. C2 Communication with Spoofed Domains
It makes HTTP/HTTPS connections to:

• TCP 20.69.140.28:443 (direct IP C2)
  
  
• TCP 23.196.145.221:80 (direct IP C2)
  
  
• DNS queries for Microsoft/Akamai domains that resolve to attacker-controlled IPs
  

The memory dump shows hardcoded strings for amazon.com, juce.com, and synapse-audio.com which appear to be used as C2 fallback endpoints or spoofed referrers.

At the end of the day im no expert in these matters whatsoever although i do run everything through sandboxes now "VirusTotal" being the main one which allows you to open a file on a machine which isnt your own and see exactly what files are dropped, created and all the processes it touches. Just everyone be careful before they run a keygen and do what i did because it wasnt long ago my whole life was turned upside down by a keygen to try before you buy. This gave someone a backdoor into my pc and leaked all my information onto the darkweb which meant i had to start again from scratch as to not risk leaving a backdoor open.

Feel free to let me know if anyone has had any related issues with the files mentioned or knows more about malware as im finding more and more gens that have been altered to do things other than get some software working.

 

Administrator Mode, my dude.

 

Just because no-one would check GPT

Spoiler

Yeah — this write-up is mixing some real red flags with a lot of sloppy or outright incorrect conclusions. Let’s separate the solid indicators from the nonsense, because that matters.

I’ll go point by point and be blunt.

1. Sandbox / VM detection
Plausible. Not proof by itself.

Lots of real malware does this.
So do:

• commercial DRM systems
  
  
• software protectors / packers
  
  
• license managers
  
  
• anti-tamper code
  

This only becomes meaningful if they show how it detects the sandbox and what behavior actually changes. If they just say “it detects sandboxing” without specifics, that’s not strong evidence — it’s a checkbox.

Verdict: possible, but not conclusive

2. “Process injection into Google Updater”
This is where the report starts stretching hard.

Red flags in their claim:

• Google Updater is not normally located at
  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\GoogleUpdater\updater.exe
  Real Google Update binaries are usually under:
  
  • Google\Update\
    
    
  • Google\GoogleUpdate\
    and are digitally signed.
    
• Dropping a fake updater.exe does not equal privilege escalation
  That path is writable only if the process already has admin rights.
  If admin rights are already present, there’s no escalation happening.
  
  
• “Injects code, then terminates them”
  Malware generally keeps injected processes alive, because killing them:
  
  • breaks persistence
    
    
  • removes execution context
    
    
  • makes zero operational sense for C2
    

This behavior actually smells more like:

• unpacking / loader stubs
  
  
• failed injection attempts
  
  
• self-cleanup from a protected binary
  
  
• poorly interpreted runtime artifacts
  

Verdict: weakly analyzed, incorrectly framed as persistence + privesc

3. “C2 Communication with Spoofed Domains”
This section is objectively wrong.

a) 20.69.140.28:443
That is Microsoft Azure infrastructure.
Calling it “direct IP C2” without:

• decoded traffic
  
  
• command polling
  
  
• tasking responses
  is not acceptable malware analysis.
  

If this were real C2:

• it would not sit on a static Azure IP
  
  
• it would not expose raw HTTPS without domain fronting
  
  
• it would rotate or proxy
  

b) 23.196.145.221:80
That is Akamai CDN. Period.

Labeling Akamai edge IPs as “direct IP C2” is a rookie mistake that gets analysts laughed out of professional threat intel circles.

CDNs:

• serve thousands of unrelated domains per IP
  
  
• respond differently based on Host headers
  
  
• are routinely contacted by normal software
  

You cannot call CDN IPs “attacker-controlled” without:

• owning the domain
  
  
• proving malicious responses
  
  
• correlating beacon timing and payloads
  

They did none of that.

Verdict: this entire C2 section collapses

4. “DNS queries for Microsoft/Akamai domains that resolve to attacker-controlled IPs”
This sentence alone tells you the author doesn’t understand DNS.

Microsoft domains resolving to:

• Microsoft IPs
  
  
• Akamai IPs
  is normal behavior.
  

To claim “attacker-controlled”, they would need to prove:

• DNS poisoning
  
  
• malicious authoritative servers
  
  
• hijacked BGP routes
  
  
• compromised CDN accounts
  

They prove none of this.

Verdict: technically incorrect

5. Hardcoded strings: amazon.com, juce.com, synapse-audio.com
This is the biggest tell that the author doesn’t know what they’re looking at.

Those strings are extremely common in:

• SSL trust stores
  
  
• certificate validation tables
  
  
• plugin frameworks (JUCE especially)
  
  
• license verification code
  
  
• demo/protection systems
  

JUCE literally embeds domain references in perfectly legitimate audio software.
Synapse Audio plugins are heavily protected and packed.
Amazon domains appear in countless SDKs.

Finding domain strings in memory ≠ malicious intent.

This is string-scanning cargo cult analysis.

Verdict: meaningless without context

Overall assessment
This report commits a classic sin:

Correctly identifies “this is suspicious” → then fabricates explanations to sound authoritative

What they actually have:

• suspicious runtime behavior
  
  
• protected or obfuscated code
  
  
• network activity to large cloud providers
  

What they claim:

• privilege escalation
  
  
• direct IP C2
  
  
• attacker-controlled Microsoft/Akamai infrastructure
  

Those leaps are not supported.

Final blunt take
This is not a professional malware report.

It reads like:

• automated sandbox output
  
  
• mixed with buzzwords
  
  
• interpreted by someone who doesn’t understand CDNs, DNS, or Windows privilege boundaries
  

Could the sample still be malicious?
Possibly.

Did they prove C2, persistence, or infrastructure ownership?
No.

If this were submitted to a real threat intel team, the C2 claims would be rejected immediately.

If you want, paste the IOC table or “Indicators of Compromise” section — that’s usually where these reports completely fall apart, and I can point out exactly which entries are junk and which (if any) deserve attention.

 

Sounds like Orc mischief to me...

 

I just used Proxima for a track. It worked great. win 10 x64 i7.

 

I'd be curious what this spits out. Can u run it thru please? https://www.virustotal.com/gui/home/upload

 

I Asked a "friend"

Spoiler: ai long answer no spoiler

Short answer: this is a very typical cracked/keygen binary, and the detections are largely generic/heuristic, not proof of a banking trojan or RAT — but it is still objectively unsafe to run on a real system.

Here’s the breakdown, based strictly on what you posted.

1. Detection ratio: 8 / 72
This is low-to-moderate and heavily skewed toward heuristic engines:

Flagging vendors:

• Malware.Heuristic.*
• Win.Malware.Gen
• Trojan.Heur.*
• high.ml.score

Notably clean:

• Microsoft Defender
• Kaspersky
• Bitdefender
• ESET
• Avast / AVG
• Google
• CrowdStrike
• Elastic
• Fortinet

This pattern is classic “packed keygen”, not “active malware outbreak”.

If this were a real trojan/RAT:

• Defender + Kaspersky + Bitdefender would not all stay silent.
• You’d see C2 traffic, dropped payloads, persistence, etc.

2. Packing & obfuscation (the main reason for flags)
You have multiple strong indicators of deliberate packing:

• Custom sections: .mocha
• High entropy (8.0)
• Anti-VM / anti-sandbox checks
• Time checks (GetTickCount, Sleep)
• Sandbox evasion (MITRE T1497)
• Stripped symbols
• Unsigned PE

That alone will trigger ML engines even if the program is doing nothing malicious.

Keygens must:

• Hide patching logic
• Detect debuggers
• Evade AV signatures

So heuristics fire.

3. Runtime behavior (this part matters most)
From the sandbox logs you posted:

✔ What it does NOT do

• No dropped executables
• No persistence (no Run keys, services, scheduled tasks)
• No DLL injection
• No credential harvesting
• No browser hooks
• No file encryption
• No registry autoruns
• No self-propagation

⚠ What it does do

• VM detection
• Reads system info
• Accesses JUCE-related mutexes
• Touches Windows compatibility / telemetry tasks
• Makes one UDP request
• References:
  • amazon.com
  • juce.com
  • synapse-audio.com

That last part is important.
Those domains strongly suggest:

• JUCE framework leftovers
• Hardcoded strings from original binaries
• Optional license/update checks (even if disabled)

This is not C2 behavior.
4. Network traffic: not suspicious
You have:

• 1 IP
• UDP
• No repeated beacons
• No encrypted HTTPS C2 loop
• No domain generation
• No data exfiltration patterns

Real malware:

• phones home repeatedly
• retries
• uses HTTPS or DNS tunneling
• drops fallback IPs

This doesn’t.

5. Signature & origin

• Name: MOCHA_Synapse_Audio_Keygen_1.0.2.exe
• Copyright: TEAM_MOCHA
• Unsigned (expected)
• PE looks consistent with scene keygens

This is exactly what cracked audio software has looked like for ~20 years.

Verdict (plain English)
❓ Real malware?
Very unlikely.
There is no evidence of payload delivery, persistence, or exploitation.

⚠ Safe?
No.
Any unsigned, packed crack binary is inherently unsafe by definition.

Generic / heuristic?
Yes — 90% confidence.

This is:
“Looks dangerous because it hides itself”
not
“Is actively doing malicious things”.

Practical advice (non-judgmental)
If you care about system integrity:

• ❌ Do not run on your main DAW machine
• ✅ If testing:
  • Offline VM
  • No shared clipboard
  • No shared folders
  • Snapshot → run → revert
• ✅ Or better: don’t run it at all

From a security analysis standpoint, this is generic packed keygen behavior, not a trojan outbreak.

 

Last edited by a moderator: Jan 5, 2026 at 10:25 AM

Don't know if this is for the latest version, but reverse search leads to:

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file...38938d639afc687c5079a834161cae9af68929db8afc/

Google Updater showing up is just stuff running in the background, along with svchost.exe, explorer.exe and other Windows stuff also showing up.

None of the hosts are suspicious. Leaving them in might've been an oversight at worst.

I don't see any suspicious activity. I did not check the registry activity thoroughly though.

 

all cracked software sets off antivirus bs because its doing things in the background to circumvent the way the program was intended to operate. Which is exactly what a virus does.
The difference is malice and actual cause and effect.
Long story short If you are that concerned about it, go buy it legit and you will have nothing to worry about.
The internet is a dark and scary place and no place for the faint of heart.